This paper draws on a comprehensive data set from Portugal to investigate the activities undertaken by cooperatives and capitalist enterprises, their internal characteristics and rates of formation and demise. We …nd a marked di¤erence in the industrial distribution of the two types of enterprise and strong support for hypotheses that cooperatives favour sectors with relatively low risk and high market power. Cooperatives were revealed to be larger, on average, than capitalist …rms and to have more highly educated and productive workforces. Entry and exit rates were lower for cooperatives than capitalist …rms and, on average, cooperatives enjoyed longer lifespans.
Introduction
A long-standing and fundamental question in economics is why …rms in market economies are typically owned by the suppliers of capital. Interest in this question, and …rm ownership more generally, has increased in recent years as a result of developments in the theory of the …rm, the recognition that, not withstanding the predominance of investor-owned enterprises, alternative organisational forms are present in signi…cant numbers, and indications that advances in technology are leading to fundamental changes in the organisation of production. 1 In this paper we focus on cooperatives as an alternative to investor ownership. Cooperatives, as Hansmann (1999) points out, are a relatively new form of organisation -having emerged as recently as the latter half of the nineteenth century -but now have a signi…cant economic presence. Notable contemporary examples include Associated Press and MasterCard -both of which are owned by consumers (media organisations and banks, respectively), the worker-owned cooperatives clustered around the town of Mondragon in the Basque region of Spain, which accounted for 8% of Basque industrial gross value added in 2008, and the farmer-owned cooperatives which are responsible for the marketing of substantial portions of agricultural output in many countries.
We address three recurring themes in the literature: the types of activity undertaken by cooperatives, their scale of operation and other internal characteristics, and their prospects for survival. Our aims are, …rst, to provide detailed descriptive evidence in each of these areas and second, to investigate the determinants of the pattern of cooperative production. In particular, we test two prominent hypotheses in the literature: that cooperatives are attracted to sectors characterised by low risk and by high levels of market concentration. Throughout to 2007, during the course of which the fate of individual …rms can be tracked.
The main …ndings of the paper are, …rst, that cooperatives were widely distributed across sectors but in a pattern that di¤ered from that of capitalist …rms. Second, our analysis of these patterns provided strong support for the hypotheses on the implications of risk and market power for the organisation of production. Third, cooperatives were found to operate, on average, at a larger scale and with a more highly educated and productive workforce than capitalist enterprises. Fourth, the data revealed that ownership structure was not static, and that conversions of capitalist enterprises into cooperatives were more common than transformations in the opposite direction. Finally, we found that the lifespans of cooperatives typically exceeded those of capitalist …rms, and by some margin. For instance, whilst approximately three-quarters of cooperatives were still in existence ten years from the date of entry, less than 40% of capitalist …rms survived to this point.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The next section provides a de…nition of both cooperatives and capitalist modes of production, and describes the data. Section 3 investigates the distribution of each type of …rm across industries and also their internal characteristics. The …ndings on entry, exit and survival are presented in Section 4, and a concluding section then completes the paper.
De…nitions and data
A satisfactory comparative analysis of cooperative and capitalist production requires, …rst of all, a precise theoretical distinction between the two organisational forms and, second, a close correspondence between these theoretical entities and the types of enterprise identi…able in the data.
Following a framework suggested by Grossman, Hart and Moore, the organisational form of an enterprise can be de…ned in terms of the ownership of -and thereby the residual rights of control over -its non-human assets (Grossman and Hart, 1996; Hart, 1995; Hart and Moore, 1990, 1996) . Whilst, in principle, a particular …rm might be owned by anyone, in practice, as Hansmann (1996) points out, ownership is generally assigned to parties that have a transactional relationship with the …rm, either as suppliers of an input or as consumers of its output. The former category can usefully be divided into three groups: suppliers of …nancial capital; suppliers of labour; and suppliers of any other inputs such as raw materials.
A capitalist …rm can then be de…ned as an enterprise in which the rights to residual control are assigned to the suppliers of …nancial capital, and in proportion to the amount of capital supplied. These control rights would typically cover matters such as the choice of products and prices, and decisions on employment and investment. In practice, such rights might be exercised directly or indirectly through the appointment of specialist managers. In the latter case, the owners retain ultimate control through their right to dismiss the management.
In this framework, a cooperative can be de…ned as an enterprise in which the rights to residual control are assigned to one of the other (i.e. other than capital suppliers) contracting parties, and in which these "members" exercise control on the basis of one-member, one-vote.
Once again, decisions-making might be delegated to specialist managers.
Our data are derived from the Quadros de Pessoal, an annual survey produced by the Portuguese Ministry of Labour and Social Security. All …rms that have one or more wage earners are included in the survey with the exception of …rms engaged in certain aspects of public administration and domestic work. As mentioned earlier, the Quadros de Pessoal classi…es …rms according to their legal form, which enables us to identify both cooperative and capitalist …rms.
Under Portuguese commercial law, the rules governing the operation of cooperatives are set out in Article 3 of the "Código Cooperativo", which draw on principles set down by the International Co-operative Alliance. Two of these principles, concerning "democratic management" and "autonomy and independence" indicate a close correspondence with the above theoretical de…nition of a cooperative. On the issue of democratic management, the Código states: "The co-operatives are democratic organizations managed by their members, which actively participate in the formularization of policies and in making decisions. The men and women who exert their functions as representatives are responsible to the members who elected them. In the co-operatives of the …rst degree, the members have equal rights to vote (one member, one vote), and co-operatives of other degrees are also organized in a democratic form." On the matter of autonomy and independence, the Código requires that if a cooperative were to seek external capital then it must do so in a manner that maintains its autonomy as a cooperative.
In addition to cooperatives, no fewer than 39 alternative organisational forms are identi…ed in the Quadros de Pessoal. However, the vast majority of enterprises (97%) fall into one of just three categories: sole proprietorship, private limited liability company and public limited liability company. Each of these three organisational forms can be considered a capitalist enterprise on the above de…nition. Thus a sole proprietorship, in which the ownership of assets and ultimate control rests in the hands of a single individual, is the classic capitalist …rm of Alchian and Demsetz (1972) . In limited liability companies, whether private or public, ultimate control rests in the hands of shareholders on the principle of one-share-one-vote. The shareholders are capital suppliers in the sense that they are entitled to the residual proceeds from the sale of the assets should the …rm be liquidated. Thus such enterprises also correspond to the de…nition of a capitalist enterprise.
Our objective is to compare cooperatives and capitalist …rms as alternative modes of production and one complicating factor is that not all cooperatives engage in the production. Hansmann (1996) , for instance, points out that some farmer-owned cooperatives are simply vehicles for negotiating the price of their produce. Similarly, some consumer-owned cooperatives are set up with the sole purpose of facilitating coordination among consumers when bargaining with suppliers over price. Ideally, we wish to exclude all such organisations and so focus attention on the set of cooperatives that do engage in production. We shall refer to these as "production cooperatives" (PCs).
The Quadros de Pessoal itself goes some way towards identifying the set of PCs by virtue of the fact that it excludes any organisation which does not employ at least one worker.
To further re…ne the sample, we removed any …rm (whether cooperative or capitalist …rm) which reported zero revenue in all periods, and all enterprises engaged in wholesale and retailing activities (NACE Section G). 3 Section G includes, inter alia, "cooperative buying association", "cooperative associations engaged in the marketing of farm products" and retail "consumer cooperatives".
As a further data cleaning exercise, we excluded all enterprises engaged in agriculture, hunting, forestry or …shing on the grounds that there is general acceptance among users of the Quadros de Pessoal that these sectors are characterised by under-reporting. 4 Finally, we paid careful attention to a …rm's legal status. In some instances a …rm was present in the data at dates t and t + k but absent in between. Such …rms were retained provided their status at t and t + k was the same. All other …rms were checked for consistency of status. If a …rm's status was missing in one or more years then, provided it was constant in the other years, the missing entries were imputed. 5 In the analysis to follow, we will consider both a total capitalist …rm measure -companies plus sole proprietorships (CF2) -and companies alone (CF1). The reason for this approach that sole proprietorships are distinct from both companies and cooperatives by virtue of the fact that ownership and control is restricted to a single individual. This restriction is, as we shall see, strongly re ‡ected in the data on capitalist enterprises. Furthermore, since a cooperative must, by de…nition, have at least two members it seems natural to make comparisons with a capitalist organisation which similarly allows for multiple owners, as well 3 Firms are classi…ed according to the Portuguese CAE (Rev.2.1) system of industrial classi…cation which is equivalent to NACE (Rev.1.1).
4 Speci…cally, we exluded enterprises in Sections A and B of the NACE Industrial Classi…cation (Rev.1.1). 5 A number of …rms changed their legal status more than once. It is possible that this might indicate a classi…cation error and thus all results were checked for robustness to the exclusion of these …rms. Only the …ndings on the modes of PC formation and demise proved to be sensitive. This is addressed in Section 4.3.
as with the aggregate capitalist …rm measure.
Industry distributions and …rm attributes
In this section we investigate the types of activity undertaken by PCs and capitalist …rms (CFs), and their internal characteristics. We begin with theory, with the aim of identifying testable hypotheses in the literature. This is followed, in Section 3.2, by presentation of the descriptive evidence on the distribution of PCs and CFs across industries, and their scale of operation and other internal attributes. Econometric evidence, including the results of hypothesis tests on determinants of the pattern of cooperative activity, is presented in Section 3.3.
Theory
The theoretical literature has identi…ed a number of potential links between a …rm's ownership structure and its behaviour and performance. 6 Here we restrict attention to arguments that can be addressed using our data set.
One long-standing argument is that due to the inherent divisibility of …nancial capital, investors in a CF are more able to spread risks than are the members of a cooperative. Thus, in the context of worker cooperatives, Meade (1972) wrote: "While property owners can spread their risks by putting small bits of their property into a large number of concerns, a worker cannot put small bits of e¤ort into a large number of di¤erent jobs"and thus "we are likely to …nd cooperative structures in lines of activity in which the risk is not too great"(p. 426). Empirical analyses of worker cooperative entry into UK manufacturing industries by Stewart (2007, 2012) provide support for this prediction. 7 Meade's indivisibility argument can be applied, to a degree, to other forms of cooperative and thus we would expect a general tendency for cooperatives to concentrate in relatively low-risk sectors of the economy.
Hansmann (1999) points to market power as an additional factor in ‡uencing the pattern of cooperative production. He notes that consumer cooperatives have often been set up in situations where the members would otherwise have to deal with a monopoly supplier.
Similarly, monopsony power provides a rationale for input suppliers to form cooperatives.
This form of market power, he suggests, may be an important factor underlying the formation of agricultural marketing and processing cooperatives. Hence, we might expect to …nd a positive relationship between market concentration and the presence of cooperatives.
Two arguments that are frequently advanced to explain why cooperatives are far less numerous than CFs are …rst, that they are more susceptible to problems associated with collective governance and second, that they face particular di¢ culties in raising external …nance. On the former, Hansmann (1988 Hansmann ( , 1996 and more recently, Dow and Skillman (2007) argue that the owners of cooperatives are likely to have more heterogeneous preferences than investors in capitalist …rms and that heterogeneity raises the costs of collective decisiontaking. The implication is that cooperatives are likely to be more successful in situations where it is possible to maintain a relatively homogeneous membership.
The basis of the …nance argument is that in the presence of adverse selection or moral hazard, agents will be reluctant to lend money to organisations in which they are unable to exercise any control. An implication is that cooperatives may be largely con…ned to sectors of the economy with relatively low capital requirements. 8 We are not able to address the governance or …nance arguments directly, nor do we have data on industry capital requirements. However, both arguments carry the suggestion that cooperatives might be more constrained in their scale of operation than CFs, and we are able to examine the size distribution of each type of …rm and to test whether minimum e¢ cient scale a¤ects the pattern of cooperative activity.
Descriptive evidence
In this section we describe the pattern of activity of cooperatives and then examine their scale of operation. Table 1 presents the broad industry distribution of PCs and CFs, the latter de…ned here as companies plus sole proprietorships (CF2). As explained in the previous section, …rms engaged in agriculture, forestry, hunting and …shing have been excluded, as have those in the wholesale and retail sectors. areas were manufacturing (23.6%), and construction (10.3%), with the remaining sectorselectricity, gas and water, and mining and quarrying -accounted for only a few …rms.
In comparison with CFs it can be seen that cooperatives were markedly overrepresented in services and underrepresented in construction, whilst manufacturing accounted for a similar proportion of both enterprise types. A Pearson Chi-square test revealed that the overall pattern of activity of cooperatives and capitalist enterprises was signi…cantly di¤erent at the 1% level. Table 2 presents more detailed information on the manufacturing sector. It reveals a high degree of concentration of cooperative activity, with almost three-quarters of the 215 …rms in the food, beverages and tobacco sector, a further 7% in printing and publishing and 6% in clothing, textiles and leather. 9 Only a small number of PCs were active elsewhere in manufacturing.
9 A more detailed breakdown revealed that no cooperatives were engaged in the production of tobacco products. example, Ben-Ner, 1988a).
The distribution of CFs within manufacturing is quite di¤erent to that of cooperatives.
Most noticeably, less than 14% of capitalist …rms were engaged in food, beverages and tobacco, whereas clothing, leather and textiles and mechanical and metal products each accounted for more than 20% of …rms. In broad terms, it can be seen that CFs were more evenly spread than cooperatives across the spectrum of manufacturing. A Pearson Chi-square test con…rmed, once again, that two distributions are signi…cantly di¤erent at the 1% level.
Information on the service sector is presented in Table 3 . We now turn to consider the sizes distributions of the two types of …rm measured in terms of …rst, employment and then sales revenue. The table also shows that, for all …rm categories, the size distribution is heavily skewed.
In the case of PCs, the median …rm employed 9 workers and 53% of …rms employed fewer than 10 workers. The predominance of small enterprises is even more pronounced among CFs, with approximately 77% of companies, and 81% of all CFs, having fewer than 10 employees. 13 Perhaps surprisingly in view of the theoretical arguments, the data also reveal the presence of a signi…cant number of medium and large PCs: 12% of PCs employ 50 or more workers and a third of these have a workforce of 100 or more. By contrast, only 2% of capitalist …rms employ 50 or more workers.
This …nding that PCs are capable of operating on a large scale is not new even in the case of worker cooperatives, which one might expect to face the most severe constraints on size. Dow (2003, p.47) , for example, reported the existence of construction …rms in Italy 1 0 The "other" category includes, among other activities: arts, entertainment and recreation, repair of household goods and various personal services.
1 1 The di¤erence is signi…cant at the 1% level using a Pearson Chi-square test. 1 2 Sole proprietorships employ two people on average. 1 3 The di¤erence between the PC and CF means, and the di¤erence in medians, are signi…cant at the 1 % level.
which employed about 3,000 workers and enterprises in the Mondragon group employing 200-300 workers. Indeed, Ben-Ner (1988a) reports that, in the 1980s, the mean employment level among Mondragon worker cooperatives exceeded 200 workers. We should note, however, that elsewhere the typical worker cooperative was considerably smaller: 27 workers, on average, in France and 40 in Italy. More recently, Burdín and Dean (2009) report that in Uruguay in 2005, the average worker cooperative employed 26 workers, which was almost twice the CF average.
In Table 5 we consider sales revenue as an alternative indicator of …rm size. The data reinforce the message that PCs are, on average, substantially larger than their capitalist counterparts, with the average mean annual revenue of 2 million euros in PCs being approximately twice the CF …gure.
Estimation and results
We now examine the relationship between organisational form, …rm attributes and industry characteristics within a multivariate framework. Speci…cally, we estimate the following logit model:
where y i;t takes the value 1 if …rm i is a PC and 0 if it is a CF (CF2), x f i;t is a vector of …rm characteristics, x s i;t is a set of industry characteristics and D s ; D r ; D t are sector, region, and year dummies respectively. 14 In addition to …rm size (employment), the vector of …rm characteristics comprises, a multiplant dummy, …rm age and age squared, log labour productivity, the average education 1 4 The sector dummies are de…ned at the 2-digit level.
of the workforce (years of schooling) and the proportion of males in the workforce. This set of variables allows us to further explore the relative size of the two types of enterprise and also to consider the attributes of their workforces.
The industry variables were selected with the particular objective of testing the hypotheses on the implications of risk and market power for the pattern of cooperative production.
The risk of entering an industry can be expected to be positively related to the volatility of industry demand and the sunk costs of entry and exit. To capture demand volatility we employ a measure of the variation in sales suggested by Cuñat and Merlitz (2012) in their analysis of the implications of volatility and labour market ‡exibility for comparative advantage. The variable is constructed by …rst calculating, for each …rm, the standard deviation of the annual growth rate of its sales, the latter being measured by the year-di¤erence in sales.
The volatility measure, V olatility, is then calculated as the employment-weighted average of these standard deviations across all …rms in the industry. This measure, as Cuñat and Merlitz point out, is una¤ected by any trend growth in …rms'sales. 15 In the absence of a direct measure of industry sunk costs of entry and exit, we constructed a proxy based on entry and exit rates. This approach has been used in the literature on entry and survival by, for example, Mata and Machado (1996) and more recently, Bernard and Jensen (2007) . The premise is that, in steady state, entry and exit rates will covary with the level of sunk costs. Following Bernard and Jensen (2007) , we utilize the following proxy which allows for the fact that industries might not be in equilibrium:
Entry costs s;t = 1 fmin (Entry s;t ; Exit s;t )g where Entry s;t is the industry entry rate de…ned as the number of …rms entering the industry during the period t 1 to t divided by the total stock of …rms at time t. Similarly, Exit s;t is the industry exit rate de…ned as the number of …rms exiting the industry during the period t to t + 1 divided by the total stock of …rms at time t.
To test the hypothesis that market power is conducive to the formation of cooperatives, we include a market concentration variable, Concentration, measured as the Her…ndahl-Hirschman Index.
Ideally, we would also include a measure a measure of industry capital requirements to assess the argument that cooperatives are at a comparative disadvantage in activities that have high capital requirements. Unfortunately, we do not have data on capital. Instead, we incorporate a proxy for minimum e¢ cient scale, M ES. The proxy, suggested by Lyons (1980) , is based on the employment level in …rms that operate, on average, 1.5 plants. 16 If it were the case that the capital-output ratio was constant across industries, then there would be a direct relationship between minimum e¢ cient scale and capital requirements. However, in practice the capital-output ratio can be expected to vary across industries and thus M ES cannot be given this interpretation.
Each of the above industry variables is measured at the 4-digit NACE (5-digit CAE) level. Table 6 reports the estimates from the logit model, using pooled data for the years 1995-2007. All speci…cations include region and NACE 2-digit sector …xed e¤ects. We …rst consider the …rm characteristics. The coe¢ cient on …rm size is positive and highly signi…cant in all speci…cations indicating that, other things being equal, the probability of a …rm being organised as a cooperative increases with size. Thus the earlier size di¤erential …nding continues to hold after controlling for age, other …rm characteristics, industry, region and the year of operation. Furthermore, the results reveal a positive relationship between a …rm operating more than one plant and being organised as a cooperative.
The coe¢ cients on age and age squared indicate that, up to a point, there is a positive relationship between a …rm's age and the probability that it is a cooperative. This is pursued in Section 4, where we examine the survival prospects of the two types of …rm. The probability that an enterprise is organised as a cooperative is also increasing in labour productivity and the educational level of the workforce, and negatively related to the proportion of males. 17 However, the lack of signi…cance of the coe¢ cient on productivity in column (4) indicates a degree of correlation among these variables. With this one exception, the signs and signi…cance of all of the …rm attributes are robust to the inclusion of the set of industry variables.
In columns (3) - (5) the four industry variables are introduced alongside the …rm attributes. The demand volatility variable is negative and signi…cant at the 1% level in all three speci…cations. This is consistent with the hypothesis that cooperatives o¤er owners less protection against risk than capitalist enterprises. The hypothesis receives further support from the similarly negative coe¢ cient on the proxy for sunk entry and exit costs.
The coe¢ cient on market concentration is positive and signi…cant at the 1% level, thus o¤ering strong support to the argument that market power encourages the formation of cooperatives.
Finally, the positive and signi…cant coe¢ cient on the proxy for minimum e¢ cient scale reinforces our earlier contention that cooperatives are capable of producing on a large scale.
Entry, exit and survival
There is now a large empirical literature on the entry, exit and survival of capitalist …rms.
By comparison, empirical work on cooperatives is in short supply and, with a few exceptions, focussed solely on worker cooperatives. 18 Our aim in this section is to provide basic information on the entry, exit and survival of cooperatives of the form provided -for the aggregate of all …rm types -by Dunne et al. (1988) for US manufacturing and, more recently, Disney et al. (2003) for the UK. Such information, as Dunne et al. point out, provides a valuable foundation for both theoretical and empirical analyses.
We therefore begin with a detailed description of entry and exit over the period 1996-2006. Data are presented on the annual number of PC entrants, exitors and continuing …rms, and comparisons drawn with equivalent …gures for CFs. For PCs, we also identify the modes of entry and exit. The remainder of the section then examines the lifespans of the two types of enterprise.
Stayer
Present in t, t 1 and t + 1
Entrant Present in t, absent in t 1
Exitor Present in t, absent in t + 1
Transient Present in t, absent in t 1 and t + 1
Following a classi…cation suggested by Disney et al. (2003) , a …rm that appears in the data in year t is categorised as a stayer, entrant or exitor as shown below. In addition, a …rm that is present in t, but absent in t 1 and t + 1 is identi…ed as a transient …rm. Such …rms are a subset of both the entrant and exitor categories. Thus the total stock at any point in time is the sum of the stayers, entrants and exitors minus the number of transient …rms.
Our interest lies with the organisational form of an enterprise (PC or CF) and thus each of the above categories is de…ned in terms of the speci…c enterprise type. Thus, for example, in the data on PCs a stayer is a …rm that was present in the market in t, t 1 and t + 1 and was constituted as a PC in each of these years. Similarly, a PC entrant is an enterprise that existed as a PC in t, but did not exist as a PC in t 1 (it was either absent from the market or present in the market but constituted as a CF).
Entry, exit and continuation rates
The basic data on PC stocks and ‡ows over the period 1996-2006 are presented in Table 7 .
The number of PCs increased gradually from 769 in 1996 to 968 in 2006, which represents an average annual growth rate of just over 2.5%. At any point in time 89.3%, on average, of these …rms would have been in the market for at least a year and would still be present in the following year. We refer to these as "continuing …rms" or "stayers". The annual number of entrants was, on average, 56 which gives a mean entry rate of 6.7%. The average number of exitors was somewhat lower at 40 which yields a exit rate of 4.5%. The sum of these three percentages slightly exceeds one hundred due to the presence of a small number of "transient …rms". These are …rms that are present in the market for only one year and thus count as both entrants and exitors. On average, there were 4 such …rms in any one year, which represents 0.5% of the stock.
The di¤erence between the mean entry and exit rates re ‡ects the growth in the population of PCs over the period. The table also reveals considerable The equivalent data for companies (CF1) and all capitalist …rms (CF2) are presented in Table 8 .
Notice …rst that the stocks of both CF1 and CF2 grew strongly over the period, approximately doubling in size. Since the population of cooperatives grew at a slower rate, caution should be exercised when making comparisons. Nevertheless, there is a marked contrast in the …gures, which can be seen most clearly in the proportions of stayers and transients, Referring back to Table 7 it can be seen that, for cooperatives, the percentage of stayers varied between 81.4% and 91.5% and exceeded 90% in the majority of years. In the case of capitalist …rms, by contrast, the percentage of stayers never reaches 90%; for companies, the maximum …gure is 83.2% and for all capitalist enterprises, 81.1%. Table 7 also revealed that among PCs the proportion of transient …rms was just 0.5% on average, whilst in Table   8 we see that for capitalist companies the …gure is 0.9%, and for all capitalist …rms. 1.6%.
These di¤erences are re ‡ected in the entry and exit rates. For cooperatives, the average entry rate was 6.7%, whereas for companies and all capitalist companies the rates were 13.2% and 14.3% respectively. Similarly, the average cooperative exit rate of 4.5% is appreciably below that of companies (7.1%) and all capitalist …rms (9.7%).
Modes of formation and demise
A common theme in the literature concerns the possibility that an established enterprise might convert from one ownership structure to another. This has been a particular focus of attention in the theoretical literature on worker cooperatives. Miyazaki (1984) and Ben-Ner (1984 , 1988b , for example, argue that the members of a successful worker cooperative may have an incentive to replace any departing members with workers hired at the market wage and thus over time the worker cooperative will become transformed into a CF. There may also be situations under which worker cooperative members will …nd it worthwhile to sell the …rm to an external investor. On the other hand, an entrepreneur who initially chose to set up a CF might …nd that, at a later date, there are gains to made from selling the …rm to the workforce. This might be due to a gradual diminution of informational asymmetries within the …rm or a change in the external environment. Ben-Ner and Jun (1996) examine the incentive for an entrepreneur to sell the …rm within a bargaining framework and show that a takeover by the workforce is more likely when pro…ts are low. 19 The issue of conversions has been discussed in relation to cooperatives more generally by Hansmann (1996) . Hansmann's premise is that organisational form is, in the main, determined by e¢ ciency considerations and that the costs associated with changes in ownership are relatively modest. Thus, he notes that, due to the speci…c nature of entrepreneurial activity, a …rm might initially be owned by a single individual or small set of individuals but later sold to a di¤erent set of patrons. Similarly, a subsequent change in the external environment might trigger a change in ownership structure. 20
In the light of these arguments we examine the modes of formation and the frequency and direction of …rm conversions within the data. We focus attention on cooperatives distinguishing, on the entry side, between PCs that were created de novo and those that arose as a result of the transformation of a previously existing CF and, on the exit side, dissolutions (where the productive unit ceased to exist) from transformations into a CF. 21 Table 9 presents the …ndings expressed as annual averages over the whole period and, as an indicator of recent experience, for the …ve years from 2001 to 2006. A number of …rms in the sample changed their legal status more than once. It is possible that this might indicate a classi…cation error and thus all results were checked for robustness to the exclusion of such …rms. The …ndings on modes of PC formation and demise proved 1 9 See Dow (2003) for further theoretical discussion of transformations and Abramitzky (2008) for an analysis of membership levels in the speci…c case of Israeli kibbutzim.
2 0 Hansmann does recognise that there may be impediments to changes in ownership structure. See, for example, the discussion in Hansmann (1996, p.46) .
2 1 In the case of CFs, transformations account for a negligibly small proportion of both entry and exit. 2 2 For evidence on transformations speci…cally involving worker cooperatives, see Ben-Ner (1988a) . Kalmi (2012) notes that almost all worker cooperative entrants in Finland over the period 1988-2005 were created de novo.
to be sensitive, and in Table 10 we therefore present results for the restricted sample which excludes all …rms that changed status more than once. The e¤ect is to slightly reduce the contribution of transformations to both entry and exit, but without changing the message that conversions from CFs to PCs are numerically more important than those in the reverse direction.
Survival
We now turn to consider the survival prospects of cooperatives in comparison with capitalist enterprises. We begin by examining the survival of the …rm as a speci…c organisational type. Thus the lifespan of a PC is de…ned as the period from its formation as a PC to its demise, either through dissolution or conversion to a CF. 23 As we saw in the previous section, conversions into CFs accounted for approximately 3% of total PC exits. In the case of CFs, transformations account for a negligibly small proportion of both entry and exit. 24 Table 11 presents the …ndings on the survival rates of both PCs and CFs. The …gures show the percentage of …rms of each type that were still surviving at speci…ed intervals following their formation (entry). 25 The table reveals that over 95% of PCs survived beyond their …rst year, more than 93% survived beyond the second and 86% were still in operation …ve years after the date of entry.
2 3 The date of formation is taken as the date on which the …rm was constituted, as reported in the data set. 2 4 Our interest lies in the distinction between PCs and CFs and so a change in status from sole proprietorship to company, or vice versa, is not regarded as a transformation.
2 5 The lifespan of each …rm was computed as the di¤erence between the last year that the …rm was observed in the data set and the year the …rm was constituted as reported in the data. The data are right censored.
Almost three-quarters of PCs were still in existence ten years after entry and one half survived for 20 years or more. One important …nding then, is that PCs are capable of surviving in the market for considerable periods of time and a substantial proportion do so. The second clear message to emerge from the data is that PCs typically survived longer than CFs, and by some margin. It can be seen that, at every speci…ed interval following entry, the proportion of PCs that were still in operation exceeded the proportion of surviving CFs (CF1 or CF2).
Thus, for example, less than 40% of CFs remained in existence ten years after the date of entry and only 14% survived beyond 20 years.
An alternative approach to the issue of …rm survival is to consider the lifespan of the production unit. That is, to measure the lifespan of the enterprise as the period from its formation to its dissolution, rather than to its dissolution or transformation. At least from the standpoint of the founders of a …rm, this might be the more interesting measure. In Table   12 , therefore, we distinguish …rms on the basis of their legal status at the time of formation and measure the time to dissolution, disregarding any changes in status along the way. In the case of CFs the survival rates are almost identical to those in Table 11 . For PCs, on the other hand, there is a noticeable increase, albeit a small one. For instance, the proportion of PCs surviving to the age of 10 rises from 74.2% to 79.7% and the proportion that survived for 20 years or more increases from 50.6% to 54.7%.
Conclusions
In this paper we have drawn on a comprehensive data set from Portugal to provide a detailed comparison of cooperative and capitalist modes of production, and to test hypotheses on the implications of risk and market power for the pattern of cooperative activity.
The industry distributions of the two types of …rms were shown to be markedly di¤er-ent. Within manufacturing, for instance, cooperatives were highly concentrated into food, beverages and tobacco and printing and publishing, whilst capitalist …rms were more evenly distributed throughout the sector. We found strong support for the hypotheses that market power is conducive to the formation of cooperatives, and that cooperatives are relatively unsuited to markets characterised by a high degree of risk. These industry-level …ndings complement the cross-country analysis undertaken by Jones and Kalmi (2009) , which showed that the incidence of cooperatives is strongly related to the level of interpersonal trust in a society.
An examination of …rms'internal characteristics revealed that cooperatives were, on average, larger than capitalist …rms and had more highly educated and productive workforces.
The data set permitted the tracking of individual …rms over time and the detection of any changes in ownership structure. Conversions of capitalist …rms into cooperatives were shown to be more common than transformations in the opposite direction, and accounted for approximately 14% of cooperative formations. Finally, the data revealed that the lifespans of PCs generally exceeded those of CFs, and by some margin. For instance, whilst almost three-quarters of PCs were still in existence ten years from the date of entry, less than 40% of CFs survived to this point.
On the fundamental issue of why cooperative enterprises are in a minority in market economies, our analysis suggest that the exposure of members to risk may be part of the answer. We can also point to some possible misconceptions. First of all, it is not the case that cooperatives are restricted to a small and peripheral set of economic activities. Whilst there were instances of clustering -particularly within manufacturing -the data also reveal that PCs were distributed fairly widely throughout the economy. Within services, for example, there were PCs operating in all of the subsectors.
Second, the scarcity of PCs cannot be attributed to an inability to operate on a large scale.
The vast majority of all enterprises are small, with 81% employing fewer than 10 workers.
Moreover, not only are PCs larger, on average, than CFs but some 12% employ 50 or more workers. Finally, it is clear from our analysis that the explanation for the comparative rarity of PCs does not lie with an inability to survive in the market. Rather, our …ndings suggest that cooperatives are in a minority because they are created much less frequently than CFs. 
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